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The Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) was founded in 1992 and  
now has a staff of about 300 people. At PIK, researchers in the natural and social  
sciences work together to study global change and its impacts on ecological, 
economic and social systems. They examine the Earth system’s capacity for 
withstanding human interventions and devise strategies for a sustainable develop-
ment of humankind and nature. Through data analysis, computer simulations and 
models, PIK provides decision makers with sound information and tools for 
sustainable development.
Centro Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC) is a research centre 
that aims at furthering knowledge in the field of climatic variability, including causes 
and consequences, through the development of high-resolution simulations and 
impact models, and with a special emphasis on the Mediterranean Area. The 
Climate Impacts and Policy Division, led by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, develops 
the socio-economic research of the Centre and provides support to policy makers 
involved on the international climate negotiations and dealing with the set-up of 
mitigation and adaptation policies.
 
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) was founded in 1965 and has a 
staff of approximately 4,700 people.  PNNL is one of ten U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) national laboratories and is operated by the Battelle Memorial Institute for 
DOE’s Office of Science. PNNL’s research strengthens the U.S. foundation for 
innovation, and helps find solutions for not only DOE, but for the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, the National Nuclear Security Administration, other government 
agencies, universities and industry. PNNL’s multidisciplinary scientific teams are 
brought together to address critical U. S. and global problems.
The Energy Research Institute (hereafter, ERI) of the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) was established in 1980. It is a national research 
organization conducting comprehensive studies on China’s energy issues. The scope 
of research conducted by ERI has covered policy assessment for each field of energy 
production, distribution and consumption, to support relative policy making process 
as a government think tank. The main focus is on energy economy, energy efficiency, 
energy & environment, climate change, and renewable energy. ERI is one of the 
leading research institutes for climate change policy study in China.
The Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy (3E),Tsinghua University has  
long been on the international and domestic fronts of addressing energy, environ-
ment and economic challenges ever since the 1980s, and has come to be recognized 
with its distinguished academic achievements, as an important policy decision 
supporting and advising think-tank for government agencies, and a leading 
research institution in the field of energy system analysis, resource management 
and sustainable development as well as global climate change mitigation. Over 
the global climate change issues, 3E has been involved in the national key science 
and technology programs since the early 1990s, especially focusing on the energy 
system modeling, global strategy on GHG emission mitigation, GHG emission reduc-
tion technology options and corresponding social economic impact assessment.
 
Stiftung Mercator is one of Germany’s largest foundations. It initiates and funds 
projects that promote better educational opportunities in schools and universities. 
In the spirit of Gerhard Mercator, it supports initiatives that embody the idea of 
open-mindedness and tolerance through intercultural encounters, encouraging  
the sharing of knowledge and culture. The Foundation provides a platform for new 
ideas to enable people – regardless of their national, cultural or social background – 
to develop their personality, become involved in society and make the most of  
the opportunities available to them. In this sense it is committed to inspiring ideas. 
Stiftung Mercator takes an entrepreneurial, international and professional  
approach to its work. It has a particular affinity with the Ruhr area, the home  
of its founding family.
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5Executive summary
ExPLORING ENERGy DEMAND  
AND SUPPLy UNCERTAINTy 
An exploration of uncertainty on drivers of 
energy demand and supply is indispensable  
for better understanding the prospects of 
long-tern climate stabilization. 
 
The RoSE study is the first of its kind to  
systematically explore the impact of economic 
growth, population and fossil fuel scarcity, 
in scenarios with and without climate policy, 
using a model ensemble. A feature of RoSE is 
the participation of five established integrated 
assessment modelling teams from three  
important regions in international climate 
policy negotiations: the EU, the USA and China. 
Economic 
growth and  
fossil fuel  
availability as 
drivers of CO2 
emissions  
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Neither slow nor rapid economic growth solves 
the climate problem by itself. 
In the absence of climate policy and if energy 
intensity improvements continue along histori-
cal trends, higher economic activity implies 
higher energy demand and greenhouse gas 
emissions. The increase in energy and carbon 
intensity improvements with higher economic 
growth is overcompensated by the larger 
growth in per capita income. Even under slow 
economic growth assumptions, GDP will rise 
significantly above today’s level, leading to an 
increase in greenhouse gas emissions.
FOSSIL FUEL AVAILABILITy 
Fossil fuel scarcity is insufficient to slow global 
warming significantly.  
Low fossil fuel availability leads to levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions that are higher than 
those under climate change stabilization.  
Nevertheless, fossil fuel availability signifi-
cantly influences the energy mix and the C O 2 
emissions in scenarios without climate policy.
ENERGy USE 
There are robust patterns in projections of  
energy use in the absence of climate policy.  
Higher economic growth increases the scale 
of the energy system, which continues to be 
mostly supplied by fossil fuels. Structural differ-
ences in the energy supply mix occur for varia-
tions in fossil resource availability, particularly 
coal and oil supply. Models unanimously show 
an electrification of energy end use indepen-
dently of economic growth and fossil resource 
assumptions. 
A study on  
Roadmaps 
towards  
Sustainable 
Energy futures 
( RoSE ) 
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Requirements  
of climate  
stabilization 
EMISSIONS PHASE OUT 
Climate stabilization requires a phase out  
of global greenhouse gas emissions in the 
long run. 
For a stringent stabilization target compat-
ible with the 2 °C goal (a level of 450 ppm CO 2 
equivalent in the atmosphere), net emissions 
have to be nearly phased out by 2100. For a less 
ambitious, but still stringent stabilization level 
of 550 ppm CO 2e, emissions would need to be 
more than halved by the end of the century, 
and decline towards zero in the 22nd century.
ENERGy SySTEMS TRANSFORMATION
Climate stabilization implies a fundamental 
transformation of global energy systems. 
Climate stabilization requires a transformation 
to a low carbon energy system in the 21st century 
with historically unprecedented decarboniza-
tion rates. Models tell different stories when 
and what to reduce, but some robust patterns 
emerge. On the supply side, coal is rapidly  
replaced with non-fossil energy sources.  
On the demand side, models foresee a larger 
share of electricity and gases coupled with a 
strong reduction of solids. The structure of the 
energy transformation is largely unaffected by 
variations in fossil fuel availability and eco-
nomic growth. The effect of fossil fuel avail-
ability on fossil fuel use is negligible in climate 
stabilization scenarios. Thus, climate policy 
effectively limits uncertainty about future fossil 
fuel use. 
CARBON PRICES AND MITIGATION COSTS
Variations in economic growth and  
fossil fuel availability can alter carbon prices 
and mitigation costs substantially. 
A supply push of fossil energy can be more  
easily neutralized with a carbon price signal 
than a demand pull due to higher levels of  
economic output. Thus, carbon prices vary  
more strongly with growth projections than 
with fossil fuel availability. Mitigation cost  
estimates are sensitive to economic growth 
and fossil fuel assumptions. Costs increase  
by approximately 30 to 100 % from low to  
high economic growth, and from low to high 
fossil fuel availability.
7Fragmented  
and delayed  
climate action  
WEAK POLICIES 
Current climate policies are insufficient  
for 2 ° C stabilization 
 With the currently planned climate policies 
and pledged emissions reductions the world is 
not on track towards the 2°C target. If current 
trends of weak and globally uncoordinated 
climate policies continue, global mean tem-
peratures are likely to increase by more than 
3°C by 2100. 
DELAyED ACTION
Delaying action greatly increases the  
challenge of keeping warming below 2 ° C.
In case of a further delay in the implemen-
tation of comprehensive global emissions 
reductions the transformation effort needs to 
be compressed into a shorter period of time. 
These higher emission reduction rates required 
in such later-action scenarios imply, inter alia,  
i) faster decarbonization of the energy system, 
ii) faster reductions of energy demand, iii) 
more stranded investments due to pre-ma-
turely retired fossil capacities, and iv) higher 
transitory economic losses during the phase- 
in of climate policies. The implications of  
delaying action until 2030 are considerably 
more severe than those of a delay until 2020. 
While the models are able to compute  
low-stabilization scenarios with a prolonged 
delay of action, the dramatic increase in 
mitigation challenges in case of policy  
delay until 2030 make it seem unlikely that 
such pathways can be implemented in the  
real world. 
Regional  
perspectives
CHINA
Climate stabilization implies a fundamental 
energy transformation for China.
Carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion 
in China are expected to double from 2005 lev-
els by 2020. Different assumptions on climate 
policy driven carbon intensity reductions lead 
to a large range of 6-12 Gt C O 2 emissions by 
2050, as calculated with an energy system 
model of the Chinese economy ( China-TIMES 
model ). Climate stabilization scenarios from 
global models show emissions in China below 
or at the low end of this range in 2050. The 
emission trajectories differ across models but 
all peak during 2020-2025 for the 450 ppm C O 2 e 
target and 2025-2030 for the 550 ppm C O 2 e 
target. This indicates that stringent climate 
targets would imply ambitious emission reduc-
tions in China.
AFRICA
The rates of economic and population growth 
in Africa have profound implications for energy 
use and greenhouse gas emissions.  
Today Africa accounts for a modest 3% of global 
energy system CO 2 emissions. The evolution 
of Africa’s emissions over the coming century 
depends critically on future population and 
income. Absent any climate policy, Africa could 
become a major emitter in the second half of 
the 21st century if economic growth in this part 
of the world is steady.
In the shorter term, the extent of energy  
poverty and improvements in access to modern 
energy in Africa are also driven by assumptions 
regarding future population and economic 
growth. Slower economic growth and larger 
population growth result in a significantly 
slower transition to modern energy access and 
use on the continent.  
Executive summary
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Sectoral  
perspectives
ENERGy RESOURCE MARKETS
Climate policies have a strong impact on 
energy resource markets, resource rents and 
energy security. 
Climate policies interfere with fossil fuel mar-
kets and reallocate rent incomes from provid-
ing scarce goods. The global losses of fossil fuel 
rents are overcompensated by revenues from 
carbon pricing. The losses of rents from coal are 
much smaller than those for oil, though coal 
is the fossil fuel that needs to be reduced the 
most. Achieving the 2°C target still allows using 
conventional and unconventional oil reserves. 
Large part of the coal reserve needs to be left 
underground. 
Energy security is significantly improved by 
climate policy under all assumptions about re-
source availability and GDP growth. That is due 
to a reduction of risks associated with energy 
trade and an increase in the resilience of energy 
systems through higher diversity. Climate policy 
also makes total energy supply, the energy mix 
and energy trade more predictable and possibly 
easier to manage. Climate policies may also 
entail certain risks for energy security. In par-
ticular, deep penetration of solar energy in the 
electricity sector or biofuels in the liquid fuels 
sector may reduce the diversity of these energy 
systems by the end of the century.
LAND USE
Population, economic growth, and fossil fuel 
scarcity all have implications for land use. 
Larger populations require more food, increas-
ing the extent of cropland area. Wealthier 
populations tend to eat more meat, a land-
intensive commodity, increasing cropland and 
pasture cover. Growing, wealthier populations 
also demand more energy. Fossil fuel scarcity 
drives increased consumption of bioenergy 
and land devoted to its production.  All three 
of these effects lead to reductions in forest 
cover and increases in land-use change  
CO 2 emissions.
INVESTMENTS AND INNOVATION 
Economic growth and fossil fuel scarcity can 
both stimulate clean energy innovation and 
non-fossil-fuel investments. 
When economies grow faster energy resources 
are used more efficiently, but fossil fuels would 
remain the prevalent source of energy.   
In contrast, the expectation of high energy 
prices could redirect ample financial resources 
to R&D programs aimed at developing new  
energy sources. 
Although economic growth and fossil fuel 
prices can create an economic opportunity  
for more investments in non-fossil energy tech-
nologies and clean energy R&D, still they would 
lag behind the levels observed in stabiliza-
tion scenarios and would not induce emission 
reductions compatible with climate stabiliza-
tion objectives. On average, baseline total R&D 
investments amount to about 67 billion 2005 
US$/yr while they increase to almost twice as 
much ( 113 billion 2005 US$  /yr) in the 450 ppm 
C O2 e stabilization scenario. The availability 
of cheap gas resources would increase gas 
investments, mostly to substitute coal espe-
cially in coal-intensive countries. yet, it would 
only marginally displace investments in clean 
energy innovation. 
A study on  
Roadmaps towards 
Sustainable 
Energy futures
1
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A broad and systematic exploration of 
uncertainty on key drivers of energy demand 
and supply is indispensable for better under-
standing the prospects of achieving long-tern 
climate protection targets. The RoSE study is 
the first of its kind to systematically explore 
the impact of economic growth, population, 
and fossil resource scarcity on baseline and 
climate policy scenarios in a model ensemble. 
The aim is to provide a robust picture on 
energy sector transformation scenarios for 
reaching ambitious climate targets. That is 
achieved by assessing the feasibility and 
costs of climate mitigation goals across 
different reference assumptions, different 
policy regimes, and different models
The RoSE project has several unique features 
that distinguish it from past integrated 
assessment model comparison projects and 
frame the project objectives:
•	 Participation	of	established	integrated	
assessment modeling teams from three 
important regions for climate policy making: 
the EU, the USA and China ( Box 1 –1 ).
•	 Exploration	of	a	large	scenario	space	
defined by a range of reference assumptions 
and climate policy stabilization targets.
•	 Harmonization	of	key	input	assumptions	
in order to provide a better understanding on 
the effect of input versus model assumptions.
•	 Analysis	of	the	future	development	of	the	
Chinese energy system by both global and 
regional modeling.
•	 Participation	of	domain	experts	in	the	
areas of energy security, transportation,  
fossil fuel availability, and access to electriity,  
with the aim to embed scenarios and model 
results in a larger context beyond model 
boundaries.
RoSE is in the process of producing a large 
scenario data base and a series of research 
papers that can serve as a key input to interna-
tional climate policy assessments, like the  
IPCC 5th Assessment Report.
Uncertainty regarding future population 
growth, economic development and fossil 
fuel availability, and its implications for 
climate policy are crucial for the climate 
debate. This uncertainty is explored and 
quantified in RoSE by means of baseline and 
policy scenarios (Box 1–2). The specification  
of the RoSE scenarios is based on three key 
dimensions: 
•	 underlying	assumptions	on	future	 
socio-economic development determined  
by population and economic growth; 
•	 reference	assumptions	on	long-term	fossil	
fuel availability and accompanying extraction 
costs, with a focus on variations of coal,  
oil, and gas; 
•	 stringency	and	timing	of	climate	protection	
targets and framework of international 
climate policy. 
11
China TIMES: The China TIMES model 
is a dynamic linear programming 
energy system optimization model 
which has been adopted to study 
China’s future energy development 
strategy. TIMES incorporates the full 
range of energy processes and it is 
able to consider existing technolo-
gies as well as advanced technolo-
gies which may be deployed in the 
future. The objective function of the 
model minimizest energy system 
costs. Five sectors, namely agricul-
ture, industry, commercial, 
residential (divided into urban and 
rural) and transportation are 
considered. The China TIMES energy 
model is used to determine the 
least-cost mix of technologies and 
fuels to meet the predicted energy 
service demands until 2050.  
GCAM: GCAM is a dynamic- 
recursive model of the coupled 
global energy-economy-land- 
climate system. GCAM tracks 
emissions and concentrations of  
15 greenhouse gases and short- 
lived species. An important feature 
of the GCAM is that energy, 
agriculture, forestry, and land 
markets are integrated with the 
extent of unmanaged ecosystems 
and the terrestrial carbon cycle. 
IPAC: IPAC is a global multi-model 
framework that links social and 
economic development, energy 
activities and land use activities, 
and enables a full analysis of 
emissions. IPAC includes mainly four 
parts: (1) the society, economy and 
energy activities module, which 
mainly analyzes energy demand and 
supply , and determines energy 
prices; (2) the energy technology 
module, which analyzes the short 
and mid-term energy utilization 
technologies under different 
conditions, and determines the 
energy demand under different 
technology compositions; (3) the 
land use module, which analyses the 
emissions from land use processes; 
(4) the industrial processes 
emissions module, which mainly 
analyzes the emissions from all kinds 
of industrial production.
REMIND: The global multi-region 
model REMIND is an inter-temporal 
energy-economy-environment 
model which maximizes global 
welfare based on nested regional 
macro-economic production 
functions. REMIND incorporates a 
detailed description of energy 
carriers and conversion technologies, 
and allows for unrestricted 
inter-temporal trade relations  
and capital movements between  
11 world regions. Mitigation costs 
estimates are based on techno-
logical opportunities and constraints 
in the development of energy 
technologies.  
WITCH: The WITCH model develo-
ped by the climate change 
modelling and policy group at FEEM 
is a global integrated assessment 
model in which the non-cooperative 
nature of international relation-
ships is explicitly accounted for. The 
regional and intertemporal 
dimensions of the model make it 
possible to differentiate climate 
policies across regions and over 
time, and thus consider several poli-
cy scenarios. The model includes a 
wide range of energy technology 
options, with different assumptions 
on their future development, which 
is also related to the level of 
innovation effort undertaken by 
countries. Special emphasis is put 
on the emergence of carbon-free 
backstop technologies in the 
electricity and the non-electricity 
sectors, and on endogenous 
improvements in energy efficiency 
triggered by dedicated R&D 
investments.
Box 1-1  
Models participating  
in RoSE
Population and GDP: Models were 
harmonized to the medium 
population projection from the 2008 
Revision of the UN World Population 
Prospects (peaking at 9.4 billion in 
2070). The GDP scenarios build on 
the population projections and 
encompass assumptions regarding 
both the speed of economic growth 
(slow, medium or fast speed) and 
the convergence characteristics 
(slow or fast convergence) between 
26 aggregate world regions. The 
study also included a slow growth – 
slow convergence GDP scenario that 
was based on the high population 
projection of the UN 2008 Revisions 
(increasing to 14 billion in 2100).
Fossil fuel availability: Fossil fuel 
availability was characterized in 
terms of supply curves describing 
extraction costs as a function of 
cumulative extraction. Oil, gas and 
coal have been treated separately, 
with an additional division into 
conventional and non-conventional 
resources. Historical data for 
recovery rates have been examined 
and then extrapolated, under 
varying assumptions about 
technological progress and 
extraction costs. The output of this 
process was three extraction cost 
curves, assuming ‘low’, ‘medium’, 
and ‘high’ resource availability, for 
each of the three fossil resources. 
Climate Policy: The policy dimension 
includes different policy cases 
representing the level of ambition 
and timing of climate-policy: 
• Baseline: no climate-policy; 
• 450 ppm CO 2 e: adoption of a 
450 ppm CO 2 equivalent concentra-
tion stabilization target allowing  
for overshoot, with full when-where-
what flexibility of emissions 
reductions after 2010; 
• 550 ppm CO 2e: adoption of a 
550ppm CO 2e target, with no 
overshoot allowed, and full flexibility 
of emissions reductions; 
• Weak Policies: initially world 
regions take only moderate and 
uncoordinated action following the 
lower end of the Copenhagen 
commitment until 2020. In the 
different scenarios, either that level 
of ambition is retained throughout 
the 21st century, or a 450ppm CO 2e 
long term stabilization target 
allowing for overshoot is adopted  
in 2020 or 2030.
Box 1-2  
RoSE Scenarios
A study on Roadmaps towards Sustainable Energy futures
Economic growth 
and fossil fuel  
availability  
as drivers of  
CO emissions
2
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Neither slow nor rapid economic 
growth solves the climate problem 
by itself
In general, higher economic growth leads  
to higher energy demand and greenhouse gas 
emissions ( Figure 1 ). Final energy demand in 
2100 was projected to range between two to 
three times of today’s level ( 700 –1000 Exajoule 
[ EJ ] ). These levels correspond to assumptions 
about global economic output in 2100 ranging 
between 4 to 12 times of today’s level. 
Energy demand variations are significantly 
smaller because models assume progressive 
energy intensity improvements with GDP per 
capita growth. Models agree that those energy 
intensity improvements  – in the absence of 
dedicated policies to improve energy intensity 
beyond historical trends  – are not large enough 
to fully compensate per capita income growth. 
Consequently, a steady increase of final  
energy use both over time (as the economy 
grows) and from low to high growth scenarios  
is observed across models.
Carbon intensity of energy production  
is correlated with economic growth to a  
much lesser degree than energy intensity.  
In the absence of climate policies, it remains 
fairly constant over time so that the growing 
energy demand is converted into growing 
emissions for both slow and high growth 
scenarios. Economic growth thus cannot 
solve the climate problem by itself as some-
times suggested.
Figure 1 *1 
(a) Gross world product and 
(b) final energy use over the 
21st century; (c) CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion and industry 
( FF&I ) and (d) per capita 
final energy consumption 
as a function of per capita 
income. 
2.1
*1   Individual funnels show the 
range across three different 
models (GCAM, WITCH, and 
REMIND) for a given assumption 
about economic growth  
(denoted by the color coding). 
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14 Economic growth and fossil fuel availability as drivers of CO2 emissions
Fossil fuel scarcity is insufficient to 
slow global warming significantly
Cumulative fossil fuel use ( 2010-2100 ) in the 
absence of climate policy was estimated to range 
from 54-61 Zetajoule [ ZJ ] for low fossil fuel avail-
ability, to 72-84 ZJ for high availability. This can 
be compared with 18-19 Z J of fossil fuels used un-
til 2010 and ca. 36 ZJ of proven fossil fuel reserves 
today. The scenario of low fossil fuel availability 
leads to a stabilization of emission levels around 
2050 ( Figure 2 ). In the other cases, emissions 
continue to increase in the 2nd half of the century. 
Even if emission levels are stabilized in the 21st 
century, atmospheric CO2 levels will continue to 
rise. This is incompatible with the goal to stabilize 
climate change. Thus, fossil resource scarcity 
alone will not solve the climate problem. 
Different assumptions about fossil resource 
availability translate into differences in estimates 
about future final energy demand (models pro-
ject 700-1100 EJ in 2100). This is due to a supply 
2.2
push from lower energy prices. High availability 
leads to a more energy intensive production, and 
vice versa, as shown by all models. 
Carbon intensity is correlated with fossil fuel 
availability. It will be lower for limited fossil fuel 
supply, which requires substituting fossil fuels 
with non-fossil energy carriers to a larger degree. 
A higher fossil resource base can lead to lower 
or higher carbon intensity. It may lower carbon 
intensity if it allows a more extensive use of gas 
substituting coal for electricity production and 
a prolonged use of oil reducing the need for coal 
to liquid technologies in the long run. However, if 
the larger fossil fuel supply is dominated by coal, 
carbon intensity can increase. Models estimate 
that fossil fuel prices increase by a factor of five 
to seven over the 21st century in a situation of low 
fossil fuel availability, and only moderately  
(~two fold) in the high fossil resource scenario.
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Figure 2
(a) Oil and (b) coal prices 
as a function of cumulative 
extraction over the period 
2010 ( bottom left corner ) 
to 2100 (model letters at 
the end of the dashed 
lines); (c) CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion 
and industry ( FF&I ) and  
(d) final energy use over  
the 21st century. *2 
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There are robust patterns in  
projections of energy use in the  
absence of climate policy
Figure 3 *3 
Structural changes in  
(a) primary energy  
supply for different  
assumptions about  
fossil fuel availability  
and (b) final energy  
over time. 
2.3
Higher economic growth increases the 
scale of the energy system, which continues  
to be mostly supplied by fossil fuels.  
Structural differences in the energy supply mix 
occur for variations in fossil resource availabil-
ity, particularly coal and oil supply ( Figure 3 ). 
Models unanimously show an electrifica-
tion of energy end use independently of 
economic growth and fossil resource assump-
tions. The move towards electrification is 
amplified if fossil resources are scarce.  
In contrast, large oil and gas resources allow 
*3   Panel (a) depicts primary 
energy supply in the year 2100 for 
GCAM (G), REMIND (R), WITCH 
(W) and four different scenarios  
of fossil fuel availability.  
Panel (b) shows the development 
of the structure of final energy 
consumption for the periods 2010, 
2030, 2050 and 2100.
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more extensive use of liquids. Models also 
show a robust pattern for primary energy 
supply: a reduction of the share of oil & gas 
use coupled with an expansion of non-fossils 
and a modest expansion of coal use. Excep-
tions are i) the situation of high oil and gas 
availability, where today’s mix of primary 
energy carriers are basically maintained, ii) 
low overall fossil fuel availability, where non 
fossils are expanded much more strongly and 
iii) high coal but low oil supply, where coal  
use is increased significantly. 
Economic growth and fossil fuel availability as drivers of CO2 emissions
Requirements  
of climate  
stabilization
3
16
17Requirements of climate stabilization
Climate stabilization requires  
a phase out of greenhouse gas 
emissions
Climate stabilization at levels of 450 ppm 
or 550 ppm CO2e in the atmosphere requires 
massive emissions reductions, in particular 
in the latter half of the century (Figure 4). In 
the 450 ppm case, greenhouse gas emissions 
would need to be nearly phased out by 2100, 
possibly requiring CO2 withdrawal from the at-
mosphere (negative emissions) to compensate 
for residual emissions in non-energy sectors. 
In the 550 ppm case, emissions would need to 
be more than halved by the end of the century, 
and declining towards zero in the 22nd century 
The literature generally regards a stabiliza-
tion level of 450 ppm CO2e as being compat-
ible with the 2 degrees target. All RoSE models 
project global warming around or below 2 
degrees in the 450 ppm case. In the 550 ppm 
case, RoSE models show that temperature rises 
above 2 degrees around 2050, and reaches ~2.4 
degrees in 2100, with a slowly rising trend. If 
greenhouse gas levels are not lowered in the 
2nd half of the century, this would eventually 
lead to an equilibrium warming of 3 degrees. 
These estimates are based on the assumption 
of a climate sensitivity of 3 degrees.    
The results hold independently of the as-
sumptions on future fossil resource availability 
and economic growth.
Figure 4 
(a) CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion and 
industry (FF&I), (b) Kyoto 
gas emissions *4 , (c) total 
anthropogenic radiative 
forcing and (d) global mean 
temperature increase since 
preindustrial. 
3.1
*4   These comprise the 
long-lived greenhouse gases 
CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs and SF6.
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Climate stabilization requires a 
massive transformation of the 
energy system
Climate stabilization requires a transfor-
mation to a low carbon energy system in the 
21st century with historically unprecedented 
decarbonization rates. This requires climate 
policy intervention with carbon pricing at its 
core. Increasing the stabilization target from 
550 to 450 ppm C O2e considerably increases the 
requirements on the decarbonization of energy 
supply. Negative emissions due to bioenergy 
use coupled with CCS are utilized in most model 
runs to achieve the 450 ppm C O2 e target. 
Models can tell very different stories when 
and what to reduce. While there is broad agree-
ment on Kyoto gas emissions reductions after 
2040, large differences on C O2 fossil fuel and 
industry emissions reductions are found.
However, some robust patterns in the de-
scription of the transformation process emerge 
(Figure 5). Mitigation leads to a fast  
phase out of coal and a rapid expansion of 
non-fossils independently of assumptions  
on economic growth and fossil fuel availability. 
All models foresee a larger share of electricity 
and gases coupled with a strong reduction of 
solids in the energy demand structure, with  
the largest share of energy coming from grids 
in the latter half of the century. 
The electricity mix shows the strongest 
transformation, and the largest differences 
between models. Models respond to climate 
targets either with a dominant contribution 
from nuclear or renewable electricity.  
Compared to the impact of model differences, 
the effect of different assumptions about  
fossil fuel availability and economic growth  
is small. 
Cumulative extraction is significantly 
reduced in the climate policy cases (38-46 ZJ 
in the 550 ppm and 26-37 ZJ in the 450 ppm 
case). Climate policy strongly constrains the 
variation of  fossil fuel use with different 
assumptions about fossil fuel availability as a 
large amount of the resources has to remain 
in the ground. Thus, uncertainty about future 
fossil fuel use is effectively mitigated by 
climate policy. 
Climate policy strongly constrains 
fossil fuel use
Figure 5 *5 
Decarbonization of  
(a) primary energy supply 
and (b) electricity production. 
3.2
3.3
*5  The plot shows values for 
the 2050 for the default 
baseline scenario, and the 550 
and 450 ppm CO2e policy 
scenarios across GCAM (G), 
REMIND (R), and WITCH (W).
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Variations in economic growth  
and fossil fuel availability can  
alter carbon prices and mitigation 
costs substantially
Mitigation pathways and carbon prices are 
affected by assumptions on economic growth 
and fossil fuel availability, as those lead to dif-
ferent levels of final energy demand and green-
house gas emissions in the absence of climate 
policy. It matters whether these differences are 
due to different levels of economic growth ( de-
mand pull ) or fossil resource availability ( supply 
push ). In the former case, carbon prices vary 
more strongly (Figure 6). A supply push of fossil 
energy may be more easily neutralized with a 
carbon price signal than a demand pull due to 
higher levels of economic output. 
In an idealized setting of fully cooperative 
action, foresight, and functioning energy and 
land markets, a globally harmonized carbon 
price will lead to emissions reductions when 
and where they are most efficient. In this ide-
alized context, global direct mitigation costs 
are projected to be around or below 1% of eco-
nomic output (that would have been obtained 
in the absence of climate policy and climate 
damages; in net present value terms) for 
climate stabilization at 550 ppm CO2e across a 
range of different assumptions about econom-
ic growth and fossil resource availability. This 
cost measure does not include the benefits 
from climate protection as well as ancillary 
benefits from mitigation policies. For achiev-
ing the 450 ppm CO 2e target, mitigation costs 
approximately double compared to the 550 
ppm CO2e target. It is important to note that 
mitigation costs can be substantially higher in 
less idealized settings including multiple mar-
ket externalities and distortions.  
Assumptions about economic growth and 
fossil fuel availability can alter mitigation cost 
estimates substantially ( Figure 6 ). Mitigation 
costs increase by approximately 25 to 80% 
from low to high economic growth, and from 
low to high fossil fuel availability. Low fossils 
come in at the lowest cost due to the reduced 
need of additional transformation under cli-
mate policy plus reduction of high fossil fuel 
expenditures. High growth, high population 
and high fossil scenarios sit on the high end. 
Figure 6 
(a) Net present carbon 
prices and (b) policy costs 
for the 450 ppm CO2e 
stabilization target. 
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Fragmented  
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21Fragmented and delayed climate action
Current climate policies are  
insufficient for 2° C stabilization
The international community set a target of limiting global  
warming to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.  
However, as part of the Copenhagen Accord countries have only 
committed to relatively weak near-term emissions reduction  
pledges, and so far only few concrete climate policies and measures 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have been implemented.
By analysing scenarios in which national 
emission reductions remain comparable  
in ambition to the level implied by a  
lenient interpretation of the Copenhagen  
Pledges, we explored the consequences of  
a continuation of current climate policy  
trends. In all models we find that such  
weak policies fail to prevent a further  
increase of global GHG emissions at  
least until mid-century, and are clearly  
insufficient to meet the 2°C target.  
Rather, global mean temperature rise by  
about 3.5 ° C until 2100, with an increasing 
trend moving into the 22 nd century.
In further scenario experiments, we ex-
plored how weak near-term climate policies 
affect the challenges of reaching long-term 
climate targets. To this end, we investigated 
three variants of climate change mitigation 
scenarios aiming at a stabilization of atmos-
pheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2e 
by 2100. As outlined above, stabilization at 450 
ppm CO2e is roughly consistent with the 2°C 
target. In the first set of scenarios, we assumed 
global comprehensive emissions reductions to 
start immediately ( IMMEDIATE ). In the second 
set of scenarios ( WEAK-2020 ), we assumed 
countries to follow the weak policy scenario un-
til 2020, and to adopt comprehensive, globally 
coordinated emissions reductions consistent 
with the long-term target thereafter. Likewise, 
the WEAK-2030 scenarios assume weak climate 
policies until 2030, and comprehensive, globally 
coordinated emissions reductions thereafter. 
Comparing the results from these different 
scenario sets allows us to explore how mitiga-
tion pathways and associated socio-economic 
and technological challenges depend on the 
start date of comprehensive global emis-
sions reductions. Reaching the 450 ppm target 
requires a fundamental transformation of 
global energy systems, even if a global climate 
agreement were reached immediately. We find 
that delay of comprehensive global emissions 
reductions increases the challenge of reach-
ing stabilization levels consistent with the 2°C 
target in several aspects. While aiming at the 
same long-term greenhouse gas stabilization 
levels, later action scenarios result in some-
what higher transitory climate change, and in-
crease the likelihood of temporary overshooting 
of the 2°C target. Delaying ambitious climate 
policies results in a compression of the decar-
bonization effort into a shorter period of time, 
with higher yearly emissions reduction rates 
after adoption of the climate policy ( Figure 7 ). 
The models estimate that GHG emissions have 
to be reduced by 40 -60 % within one decade in 
4.1
Later action implies steeper  
midterm emission reduction  
requirements for reaching 2°C
4.2
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Figure 7 
Total global greenhouse gas 
emissions for alternative 
climate policy scenarios.
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case of the WEAK-2030 scenario, compared  
to peak reduction rates of 20-30 % in the  
IMMEDIATE scenario. Such high emission reduc-
tion rates are historically unprecedented. The 
implications of pathways with prolonged delay 
for global energy systems are dramatic. In the 
model scenarios, this is accomplished by a 
greatly accelerated decarbonization of energy 
supply, rapid reductions of energy demand, or 
a combination of both.
Climate policies in line with the 2°C target 
render a considerable portion of conventional, 
fossil-based energy supply capacities obsolete. 
In case of a continuation of weak climate  
policies, conventional fossil capacities increase  
further, for instance because of the construc-
tion of coal-fired power plants. As a conse-
quence, higher stranded investments due to 
premature retirement of these capacities occur 
( Figure 8d ).
23
Later action implies  
greater economic challenges  
for reaching 2°C 
The timing of emissions reductions also af-
fects the economics of climate change miti-
gation ( Figure 8 ). While near-term economic 
costs in the WEAK-2020 and WEAK-2030 scenarios 
are small, long-term costs increase by 20-80% 
compared to the IMMEDIATE scenario. These 
scenarios are also characterized by higher long-
term carbon price levels. 
For all mitigation challenges analysed, we 
find that implications of delaying action until 
2030 are considerably more severe than of a 
delay until 2020. In the WEAK-2030 scenario, 
the shift from weak policies with low carbon 
prices to comprehensive global climate regime 
with high carbon prices and comprehensive 
emissions pricing is likely to result in consider-
able economic distortions. All models find a 
decrease of household income growth of about 
0.4 % / yr in this scenario during the decade 
following the phase-in of ambitious climate 
policies. This short-term economic distortion 
is much higher than in the other climate policy 
scenario. While the models are able to compute 
low-stabilization scenarios with a prolonged de-
lay of action, the dramatic increase in mitiga-
tion challenges in case of policy delay until 2030 
make it seem unlikely that such pathways can 
be implemented in the real world. 
4.3
Figure 8 
The effect of weak 
near-term climate policies 
on (a) long-term mitigation 
costs (aggregated 
2035-2100), (b) economic 
growth in the decade 
following the implementa-
tion of stringent climate 
policies, (c) mid-term 
carbon price levels, and  
(d) unused fossil capacities. 
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Climate stabilization implies  
a fundamental energy  
transformation for China
Carbon emissions from fossil fuel combus-
tion in China are expected to increase from 
5.5 Gt CO2 in 2005 to about 11 Gt CO2 by 2020. 
Different assumptions on climate policy driven 
carbon intensity reductions lead to a large 
range of emissions by 2050 ( 6-12 Gt CO2 ), as 
calculated with an energy system model of the 
Chinese economy (China TIMES model) (Figure 
9). Climate stabilization scenarios from global 
models show emission reductions for China 
below or at the low end of the 6-12 Gt CO2 range 
in 2050. The emission trajectories differ across 
models but all peak during 2020-2025 for the 
450 ppm CO2e target and 2025-2030 for the 550 
ppm CO2e target. This indicates that stringent 
climate targets would imply ambitious carbon 
intensity reductions in China. For the 450 ppm 
CO2e target, all global models show more reduc-
tions during 2010-2050 than the most stringent 
climate policy scenario in the China TIMES. 
Based on results from IPAC, China could 
make such a contribution to transitioning to a  
2 °C world. Much focus should be given to the 
progress on technology. Full effort/collaboration 
on technology innovation/diffusion is crucial. 
The mitigation cost could be low if mitigation 
technologies are a driving force of economic 
development. 
When comparing global model results, in-
cluding IPAC, with the national model results of 
China TIMES, the global models illustrate greater 
carbon mitigation potentials with lower cost. 
This is mainly due to a substantial decrease of 
energy demand in the climate policy scenarios, 
and more rapid expansion of nuclear and re-
newable energy and CCS until 2050. 
The path towards low carbon development 
for China, a big developing country with high 
total carbon emissions with still lower per capita 
carbon emissions compared to industrialized 
countries, includes challenges and opportuni-
ties. Substantial efforts may be required to 
transform the economic development mode,  
to speed up innovation, R&D, and deployment  
of advanced low carbon technologies,  
to strengthen institutions, to advocate low 
carbon lifestyles, and to enhance international 
cooperation.
Figure 9 *6 
CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion and 
industry (FF&I) in China. 
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6*  The China Times scenarios 
C353040, C354040, C454040, 
and C455050 represent diffe-
rent requirements on carbon 
intensity improvements.
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Economic and population growth in 
Africa have profound implications 
for energy use and emissions
5.2
Today Africa accounts for a modest 3 %  
of global energy system CO2 emissions.  
The evolution of Africa’s emissions over the 
coming century depends critically on future 
population and income. Estimates of popula-
tion in 2100 in Africa vary dramatically,  
with 2 billion more inhabitants in the UN High 
population scenario than the UN Low  
population scenario. Future income growth  
is also uncertain. 
Absent any climate policy, Africa could 
become a major emitter in the second half of 
the 21st century if economic growth in this 
part of the world is steady. 2100 emissions in 
Africa could be as much as 20% of global  
CO2 emissions, with as much as 10% of global 
emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa ( Figure 1 0 ). 
In the shorter term, the extent of energy 
poverty and improvements in access to 
modern energy in Africa are also driven by 
assumptions regarding future population  
and economic growth. Slower economic 
growth and larger population growth result  
in a significantly slower transition to modern  
energy access and use on the continent  
( Figure 11 ). When climate mitigation is 
undertaken, Africa shoulders larger emissions 
reductions relative to baseline levels than  
the world on average, regardless of future 
population and income. However, the total cost 
of climate policy depends critically on assump-
tions about emissions permit allocations.
Figure 10 *7 
CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion and 
industry ( FF&I ) in Africa 
in baseline scenarios.
Figure 1 1 
Final energy use  
per capita in Africa  
in 2005 and 2050  
in baseline scenarios.
7*  Africa in GCAM corresponds 
to continental Africa, while in 
REMIND and WITCH to Sub-
Saharan Africa.
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Climate policies have a strong impact on 
fossil fuel markets and rent incomes. Rent 
incomes refer to the profits of fossil owners 
caused by the scarcity of exhaustible fos-
sil fuels or by the revenues caused by carbon 
pricing reflecting the exhaustible carbon 
budget imposed by climate policy. Since both 
are expressed in monetary value terms, they 
can be directly compared and the changes in 
rents between scenarios indicate the distribu-
tive impacts of policies. Under climate policy, 
the global losses of fossil fuel rents are over-
compensated by revenues from carbon pric-
ing ( Figure 12 ). The losses of rents from coal 
are much smaller than those for oil, though 
coal is the fossil fuel that needs to be reduced 
the most. In the 450 and 550 ppm CO2e  
scenarios, a large share of coal reserves would  
be left underground ( Figure 13 ). However, 
conventional oil and gas reserves and  
resources are utilized. Also the non-conven-
tional oil reserve would go into production.
According to results from one of the mod-
els ( REMIND ), climate change stabilization at 
450 ppm CO2e decreases fossil fuel rents over 
the 21st century by 10-15.tril.US$. The loss of 
fossil fuel rent is highest for the fast growth 
and the low fossils scenarios. The additional 
carbon rent exceeds the loss of fossil fuel rents 
in all cases of economic growth and fossil fuel 
availability ( ca. 20-25tril.US$ ). The largest 
over-compensation is resulting in the high  
fossils scenario, whereas the sensitivity to 
long-term growth variations is less important.
Climate policies reallocate fossil rent incomes
Figure 1 2 
Net present value of carbon 
and fossil fuel rents 
(discounted at 5%).
6.1.1
Climate policies have a strong  
impact on energy resource markets
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Figure 1 3 *8 
(a) Oil primary energy use, 
(b) natural gas primary 
energy use, (c) coal primary 
energy use and (d) CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion and industry 
(FF&I) and from biomass 
with CCS. 
(a) Oil primary energy use (b) Natural gas primary energy use
(c) Coal primary energy use (d) CO2 emissions from FF&I and 
  from biomass with CCS *9
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* 9   RCP levels are placed  
here for the purpose of  
comparison based on the 
recent "Representative  
Concentration Pathways".  
The numbers in the RCP  
labels indicate total forcing 
levels in 2100.
* 8   BGR (Bundesanstalt  
für Geowissenschaften und  
Rohstoffe), USGS ( US 
Geological Survey ) and GEA 
(Global Energy Assessment) 
are taken from Rogner HH, 
Aguilera R, et al. ( 2012 ) 
Energy Resources and Potenti-
als. In Global Energy 
Assessment [Johansson TB, 
Patwardhan A, Nakicenovic 
N, Gomez-Echeverri L ( eds. )],  
Chapter 7. Cambridge University 
Press. Cambridge MA.   
Rogner is Rogner HH ( 1997 ) 
An Assessment of World 
Hydrocarbon Resources. 
Annual Review of Energy and 
Environment, 22 : 217-62.
CO2 Emissions
CO2 removal  
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6.1.2
Under all assumptions about resource 
availability and GDP growth, climate policies 
significantly improve energy security by reduc-
ing the risks associated with energy trade and 
increasing the resilience of energy systems 
through higher diversity. They also make total 
energy supply, the energy mix and energy trade 
less dependent upon the variations in economic 
growth and resource availability, and thus more 
predictable and possibly easier to manage.
Climate policies may also entail certain 
risks for energy security. In particular, deep 
penetration of solar energy in the electricity 
sector or biofuels in the liquid fuels sector may 
reduce the diversity of these energy systems by 
the end of the century (particularly under high 
economic growth and low fossil fuel assump-
tions). This may be especially pronounced in 
regions which will be using their ‘competitive’ 
resources rather than relying on the global mix 
of tradable fuels. Another risk is a moderate 
increase in trade and import dependency in 
some fossil fuels in the short- to medium-term 
when climate policies supress exploration of 
coal and non-conventional oil. Finally, there is 
a risk of declining export revenues of energy-
exporting regions, but for the main energy-
exporting regions this is less pronounced, es-
pecially in the medium-term, due to continued 
demand for conventional oil and gas. 
Figure 1 4 
Global energy trade in 
baseline and climate  
policy scenarios under  
different economic  
growth assumptions.
Climate policies increase energy security
(a) Oil trade in REMIND
(c) Coal trade in REMIND
(b) Oil trade in WITCH
(d) Gas trade in REMIND
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Population, economic growth  
and fossil fuel scarcity all have  
implications for land use
Figure 1 5 
(a) Bioenergy land cover, 
(b) forest land cover,  
(c) CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion  
and industry ( FF&I ) and  
(d) CO2 emissions from  
land use change in  
baseline scenarios.
Each of the uncertainties explored in the 
RoSE project ( population, income, and fossil 
fuel resource availability ) has implications for 
land use, in addition to the implications for 
energy and mitigation. The availability and 
cost of extracting fossil fuel resources has 
an impact on the terrestrial system through 
the production and use of bioenergy. When 
fossil fuels are scarce or expensive, bioenergy 
serves as a substitute for coal and gas in the 
electricity sector, and for oil in the refinery 
sector, both with and without climate policy. 
As a result, more land is devoted to bioenergy 
production at the expense of forest cover. This 
results in lower energy system emissions and 
higher land-use change emissions. Under a cli-
mate policy, higher resource prices serve as a 
complement to carbon prices, leading to lower 
carbon prices when fossil fuels are scarce.
Increases in population and income can 
have a significant impact on emissions via 
increased strain on land and associated 
land-use emissions. Even if high population 
scenarios are coupled with low growth of 
per capita income, such that total economic 
output is lower than a medium population, 
medium growth scenario, cumulative land-use 
change emissions can be more than as 45% 
higher ( Figure 15 ). The increase in competi-
tion for land and land-use change emissions 
have implications for the cost of mitigation, as 
more mitigation is required and the potential 
for land-based mitigation ( e.g. afforestation, 
bioenergy ) options are reduced. 
6.2
(a) Bioenergy land cover (b) Forest land cover
(c) CO 2 emissions from FF&I (d) CO 2 emissions from land use change
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Economic growth and fossil fuel  
scarcity can both stimulate  
green investments
6.3
Economic growth stimulates green invest-
ments, as more resources become available to 
invest in clean energy and innovation options 
( renewables, energy efficiency ), but it also 
increases investment in conventional, fossil 
technologies. High economic and/or population 
growth exerts a pressure on energy demand, 
raising the relative prices of energy to capital. 
The change in relative prices induces a more 
efficient use of energy resources, mostly via 
capital-energy substitution.
Faster convergence across countries also 
leads to a more efficient use of energy inputs 
globally. On the one hand, faster convergence 
increases aggregate energy intensity by raising 
the weight of energy intensive developing 
countries. On the other hand, faster conver-
gence improves the use of energy resources via 
efficiency R&D and capital-energy substitution. 
This second effect prevails, and overall energy 
intensity is lower when convergence is faster.
High fossil fuel prices create an economic 
opportunity for decarbonizing the energy mix 
even in the absence of a climate policy.  
In particular, oil scarcity can provide incentives  
to invest in invention and deployment of a clean 
substitute to oil on a large scale. When fossil  
fuel resources are expected to become scarce 
throughout the century, ample financial 
resources ( in the order of 40 billion USD  /  yr as 
estimated in the WITCH model ) will be redirected 
to R&D projects aimed at developing viable new 
energy sources ( Figure 16 ). Developed countries 
will provide between half and two third of  
the global financial flows to R&D programs.  
The availability of cheap gas resources would 
increase gas investments, mostly to substitute 
coal in coal-intensive countries. yet, it would 
only marginally displace investments in renewa-
bles and clean energy innovation. The R&D 
sector would continue to attract on the order of 
10% of total energy investments.
Although economic growth and fossil fuel 
prices can create an economic opportunity for 
more investments in non-fossil energy technolo-
gies and clean energy R&D, those investments  
do not induce emission reductions compatible 
with climate stabilization objectives. Only the 
simultaneous expectation of oil, gas, and coal 
scarcity could set the per capita emission-GDP 
relationship on a path that mimics a scenario 
with moderate and fragmented climate policies.
Figure 1 6 
Annual average  
investments throughout 
the century.
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